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Introduction
In recent years banks and other commercial lending institutions
have faced a rapid increase in problem loans.' At the same time, the
relatively new phenomenon in United States law known as "lender lia-
bility" has signaled an expansion of the legal theories under which
courts may find lenders liable for damages incurred by borrowers.2 Per-
haps most significantly, many courts now allow borrowers to recover
against lenders based on various tort theories.3 Because of the broader
remedies afforded under tort theories as compared to those remedies
previously available in contract, some lenders recently have experienced
large adverse verdicts.4 If courts continue to base findings of liability on
new theories,5 lenders must choose between suffering a potentially se-
vere economic loss by refusing to aid a financially troubled borrower or
1. Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw.
L.J. 775, 775-76 (1986).
2. See J. TURNER, UPDATE: RECENT CALIFORNIA LENDER LIABILITY CASES at 33B (20th Annual
California Bankers Association Bank Counsel Seminar program materials 1987); see also
Thierbach, Lender Liability: Should Lenders be Required to Continue to Advance Credit to Mar-
ginal Borrowers?, 15 W. ST. U.L. REV. 631 (1988).
3. See Blakeboro & Heeseman, Good Faith Duties and Tort Remedies in Lender Liability
Litigation, 15 W. ST. UL. REv. 617 (1988).
4. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970); State Nat'l Bank v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 675 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
5. Johnson & Gaffney, Lender Liability: Perspectives on Risk and Precaution, 105 BANKING
L.J. 325. 321 (1988).
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risking being made party to a lender liability suit by providing such
help.' Conversely, any significant judicial curtailment of the theories
under which borrowers may proceed against lenders undermines the ef-
fectiveness of these actions to ensure fair dealing and to prevent lenders
from exploiting borrowers with respect to credit terms and conditions.
This Special Project addresses the dilemma currently facing courts
by examining critically the leading theories of lender liability and dis-
cussing three potential solutions to various aspects of the problem. Ini-
tially, this Special Project surveys today's most prevalent theories of
lender liability, as well as the impact that increasing liability has had
on lenders. This Special Project then examines three potential solutions
to the uncertainty currently plaguing the lender-borrower relationship.
First, this Special Project explores the possibility of lenders using Uni-
form Commercial Code sections 2-609 and 2-610 as a guide to conduct
so as to avoid tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing which some courts now find in loan agreements.
Second, this Special Project analyzes several state legislatures' attempts
to use the Statute of Frauds to deal with the underlying tension be-
tween protecting the integrity of written agreements, thereby promot-
ing banking stability, while still allowing for a recourse by the borrower
if the writing does not express the actual agreement. Finally, this Spe-
cial Project considers the merits of using arbitration as a means of cop-
ing with the liability explosion in lender-borrower disputes.
6. Swartz, Lender Liability, U.S. BANKER, May 1986, at 10.
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